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Abstract: The 1930s in the U.S. were marked by an economic crisis,
governmental regulatory response, and a significant audit failure.
This paper examines the profession’s struggle for legitimacy during
these times through its choice of narratives regarding professional
ethics and independence as revealed in the national professional organization’s monthly, the Journal of Accountancy. Initially “ethics is a
state-of-mind” or narrative of character was used but transitioned to
a more objectively determinable narrative of technique as the decade
progressed. To counter governmental regulation, the profession attempted to shift the independence discourse away from regulation of
accountants to regulation of client companies.

INTRODUCTION
Occupational groups that apply specialized knowledge and
skills to complex tasks and claim to serve both their own and
the public’s interest seek to define themselves as professionals.
A code of ethics is one of the most important attributes defining
a profession [Montagna, 1974] and has been termed a “unique,
dynamic record of the movement of an occupational group
toward professional status” [Casler, 1964, p. 8]. This paper tempers this functionalist view of the code of ethics with the consideration that the effectiveness of such a code depends upon
its reflecting cultural mores. In the process of changing the code
of ethics in response to social and political events, professional
groups attempt to influence members of the profession, the public, and regulators through discourse on components of its code.
This discourse is in the form of narratives that allow society to
define the criteria for competence and to evaluate performance.
As such, narratives act as legitimating devices [Preston et al.,
1995].
Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Dick Fleischman and the
two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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The form or content of these narratives changes over time, as
does the code of ethics itself, and at the beginning of the 1930s,
the phrase “ethics is a state of mind” [Richardson, 1931, p. 15] encapsulated the profession’s narrative of character. Character is “a
core constituent of personal identity” [Preston et al., 1995, p. 521]
to be developed through moral education both at home and at
school. The state-of-mind of the upright individual so developed
provided the moral guidance that could be relied upon to direct
his or her actions in an ethical manner. A corollary to this is that
unethical behavior resided in the flawed individual instead of in
the profession or its self-governance and, consequently, a limited
number of rules were needed to constitute an ethics code.
By contrast, the narrative of technique uses legal and technical rhetoric in a specialized and esoteric subject as the means
of legitmation. In this narrative, moral guidance is replaced with
rules and professional judgment. Preston et al.’s [1995] study of
U.S. accountants’ professional ethics found that a 1917 narrative
invoking the legitimacy of character had shifted by 1988 to the
legitimacy of technique. Their study does not address when this
shift occurred; however, the transition is apparent in discourse
in the American Institute of Accountants’ (AIA) official magazine, the Journal of Accountancy (JA), in the 1930s.
The 1930s opened in the aftermath of economic crisis
caused by the stock-market crash in October 1929, followed
by the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Abbott [1988] argues that the extent of
the shift from legitimacy of character to legitimacy of technique
varies among professions depending upon the relative use of
science and social structures for legitmation. The social structure of greatest significance is regulation, and the 1930s found
the accounting profession subject to significantly enhanced
regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The profession was still coping with this increased regulatory attention when the fraud at McKesson & Robbins (M&R)
was revealed in December 1938. This fraud was the “first time
accounting practices were subject to significant public and
governmental disclosure, comment, criticism and judgment”
[Barr and Galpeer, 1987, p. 160]. The SEC held hearings with
testimony from 12 expert witnesses from accounting firms. The
repercussions from this fraud closed the decade and pushed the
profession further toward the use of the narrative of technique
to attain legitimacy.
Auditor independence was not a component of the code
of ethics in the 1930s; however, the JA featured considerable
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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discourse on the subject. Similar to changing legitimacy narratives, independence was originally viewed as an integral part of
character and later was conceived as an economic commodity
[Williams, 1992]. Accountants of this era vigorously resisted inclusion of independence in the code not only through legitimacy
narrative strategies, but also by reframing the independence
discussion in terms of client regulation. Initially, reframing the
discussion focused on regulating client-auditor relationships
through how auditors were appointed to the engagement. In response to the M&R fraud, accountants continued reframing the
discussion through advocating a variety of regulations for client
companies and education for financial-statement users. Simultaneously, accountants attempted to regain legitimacy through use
of the narrative of technique as articulated through enhanced
accounting principles and auditing methods.
This paper does not debate whether accountants were
professionals in the 1930s or not, but instead considers ac
countancy to be a profession. The focus is how the accounting
profession constructed its narratives of legitimacy and responded to increased governmental regulation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section describes the primary sources and is followed by
a section describing the U.S. audit environment in the 1930s,
including the code of professional ethics. Sections on independence as an ethical construct in the 1930s, the engagement of
auditors, and the M&R audit failure follow. The last section provides concluding comments.
THE JA AND ITS SPONSORING ORGANIZATION
Articles and editorials in the JA, the official publication of
the AIA from October 1929 through 1939, are the main primary
sources used. The history of the JA and that of its sponsoring
organization are intertwined. While the JA had a single name
change, its sponsoring organization went through multiple
mergers and name changes. The JA started life as the Auditor,
the journal of the Illinois Society of CPAs, in 1904 [Zeff, 1987].
The Federation of Societies of Public Accountants in the United
States (the Federation), formed in Illinois in 1902, rivaled the
AIA as a national organization. Robert Montgomery, in his then
capacity as secretary of the Federation, acquired the journal
in 1905 and renamed it the JA. The first issue was published in
November 1905 after the Federation’s merger with the American
Association of Public Accountants (AAPA) [Zeff, 1987].
Published by eGrove, 2010
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The initial issue evinced the practitioner participation
featured throughout the magazine’s history with an article by
Montgomery on professional standards [Zeff, 1987]. An editorial
in the initial issue proclaimed the journal’s objective as “establishment of accountancy in law and opinion as a learned profession” and noted that “much, however, still remains to be done
before accountancy can take the stand on the plane of medicine
and law.” The editorial closed with three requests of its readers:
“(1) Subscribe; (2) praise The Journal publicly and criticize us
under the cover of a two-cent postage stamp; (3) tell us how to
improve The Journal” [Anon., 1905, pp. 57-59].
The AAPA was organized in 1887 and primarily operated in
New York City [Previts and Merino, 1998]. Its name changed in
1916 to Institute of Accountants in the United States of America
and then to the AIA in 1917 [Roberts, 1987]. Membership was
concentrated in urbanized states, and its leaders were often
from large, prosperous firms. Throughout the 1920s, the AIA’s
emphasis on the independent audit distanced it from account
ants in rural states who considered the AIA elitist [Previts and
Merino, 1998]. In December 1921, accountants primarily located
in the Midwest founded the American Society of Certified Public
Accountants and had a bitter rivalry with the AIA “until threat of
external intervention in the thirties forced unification” [Previts
and Merino, 1998, p. 243]. The merger in 1936 left the AIA as
the national voice for accountants in the U.S. [Montgomery,
1936]. The AIA adopted its contemporary name, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, in 1957 [Cook, 1987]
and continues to publish the JA monthly.
By the 1930s, the magazine’s masthead included the subheading “Official Organ of the American Institute of Account
ants” and the disclaimer: “Opinions expressed in the Journal of
Accountancy are not necessarily endorsed by the publishers nor
by the American Institute of Accountants. Articles are chosen
for their general interest, but beliefs and conclusions are often
merely those of individual authors.” This disclaimer appears to
have been for legal purposes more than an indicator of divergent
views. (Note that divergent views are “merely those of individual
authors.” – emphasis added) Authors tended to come from the
ranks of business, legal, and government leaders. The list of
expert witnesses who testified before the SEC about the M&R
audit failure (or “case” as the JA termed it) featured many prior
contributors to the journal. A rebuttal article generally accompanied the rare article critical of accountants or some facet of
accounting practice. The JA was used to construct narratives for
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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the profession and in so doing fulfilled its function as the “Official Organ” of the AIA. Far from being objective, disinterested,
or independent sources, these articles are reflective of the AIA’s
positions and are thus good sources for the narratives this influential segment of the profession desired to communicate in its
quest for legitimation.
The initial editors of the JA were business academics [Zeff,
1987], but during the decade of the 1930s, the JA had two nonaccountant, professional editors – Alphyon Richardson and John
Carey. Richardson was a professional journalist who assumed
the editorship in 1912 [Edwards and Miranti, 1987]. He was
also the AIA secretary (chief of operations) until he retired from
the post in 1930 and assumed only editorial duties [AIA, 1938].
Carey joined the staff of the AIA as assistant secretary after receiving his bachelor’s degree in English from Yale University in
1925 [Zeff, 1987]. He became the AIA secretary in 1930, and in
January 1937, he became managing editor of the JA. His tenure
in this position lasted until 1949, after which he became editor from 1949-1954 and publisher from 1955-1966 [Zeff, 1987].
Both editors ran unsigned editorial columns in each issue that
commented on the accounting issues of the day. Whether the editor wrote each editorial is problematic in Richardson’s case as
George O. May, an AIA leader and partner in Price Waterhouse,
may have authored many editorials published during Richardson’s tenure as editor [Previts and Merino, 1998].
Each issue of the JA featured editorials that were often
lengthy with sub-headings to denote the wide-ranging topics
covered. Commissioned works on particular topics, texts of
speeches delivered to various professional bodies, and problems
from previously administered CPA exams were published. As the
decade progressed, discussions of both proposed and enacted
governmental regulation were featured. The decade closed with
excerpts from expert testimony before the SEC regarding the
audit failure at M&R. As the actual words of the past are cited, it
should be noted that the language of the 1930s was not genderneutral. Gender-neutral language will be used when not citing
historical works. Those editorials and articles that pertain to
professional ethics and the issue of auditor independence were
examined for the type of narrative they employed.
THE ACCOUNTING AND AUDIT ENVIRONMENT
In the 1920s, demand for accounting services increased
significantly and brought changes “in the position of the pubPublished by eGrove, 2010
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lic accountant in the community” [Olive, 1929, p. 252]. These
changes were attributed to the implementation of federal income taxes in 1917, increased recognition of the importance
of an independent accountant’s report for credit purposes, the
merger and consolidation of small business units into larger
corporations, and an increased amount of public ownership of
stocks [Olive, 1929]. Montgomery [1937, p. 270], then president
of the AIA, attributed these changes to the impact of World War
I: “It may be urged that men killing each other has little to do
with our profession, but it has much to do. It was the World War
which made business cost-conscious; it was war profits which
made tax saving attractive.”
In an editorial in November 1928, Richardson [1928, p. 359]
noted: “The incorrigible optimism of the investing public con
tinues. Warnings issued by authorities have no effect and the
public buys and buys; stocks rise to a market value altogether
out of proportion to the companies’ earnings.” The Dow Jones
Industrials Index on December 31, 1928 was 300 points, but
after the October 1929 crash, the Dow recovered to end the year
at 248.5. While the change may seem small by contemporary
standards, a drop of seven points in 1928 corresponds to a drop
of 350 points when the Dow is at 10,000 [Wright, 2002].
The stock-market crash of October 1929 opened a period
of economic crisis that would last through most of the 1930s.
Previts and Merino [1998, p. 270] consider the impact of this
period on America to be “second in importance only to the years
1776-89 (from the War of Independence to the inauguration of
George Washington as president).” Auditors were not blamed for
the crash, which was instead attributed to margin buying, stock
speculation, and manipulation of stock prices by corporations
[Nouri and Lombardi, 2009].
The crash’s economic after effects caused deep decreases in
stock prices and offerings. In 1929, new capital public offerings
totaled $700 million a month according to the Commercial &
Financial Chronicle [cited in Haskell, 1938]. The Dow’s lowest
point was 41.2 points in 1932; it peaked at 194.4 in March 1937
[Wright, 2002]. During 1936 and the first ten months of 1937,
the public offerings shrank to $100 million a month. The market contracted further in November and December of 1937 and
January of 1938 to $40 million a month [Haskell, 1938]. By December 31, 1939, the Dow was at 150.2 points, a 40% decrease
from its December 31, 1929 level [Wright, 2002].
Judge John Knox of the bankruptcy court, addressing the
twelfth annual fall conference of the New York State Society
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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of Certified Public Accountants (NYSSCPA) in October 1934,
reminded accountants of the impact of their work [Staub, 1936,
p. 209]:
The power of an accountant for the service of good and
evil is no whit less than that possessed by the lawyer
and physician. The accountant’s nimbleness of mind
and his dexterity of hand can reveal truth or they [sic]
can conceal it. They may also furnish safeguards for the
preservation and increment of the nation’s wealth; or
they may be so used as to impoverish the land.
The “service of good and evil” is a rather heroic characterization
of the accountant that is indicative of the lack of objective or divergent views represented in the JA. The economically stringent
times did call for prudent and well-considered financial advisors,
accountants among them.
Companies were “moved by the exigencies of uncertain
times” [Barton, 1933, p. 91] following the 1929 market crash
to adopt independent audits as a business practice. Prior to the
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, audits were voluntary for corporations that were not in governmentally regulated industries.
The NYSE required all new listings as of July 1, 1933 to have
independent audits, citing investor regard of audits as a useful
safeguard as the reason. A survey of the 83 largest companies in
1933 found that 87% did have audits, and those with no audits
were often under governmental supervision, such as banks, utilities, or railroads. Seventy of the companies had outside auditors
for an average of 18 years. To be truly valuable, the NYSE determined that audits had to be adequate in scope and the responsibility of the auditor defined [Barton, 1933].
Although there was regulatory pressure to conduct audits,
accountants still had to contend with some adverse client reaction to audits even at the close of the decade [Retzlaff, 1939, p.
85]:
We are only too familiar with the attempts of some
businessmen to restrict the scope of our engagements,
to cut fees, and generally belittle the accountant’s work.
The objectionable practice of asking for bids is an outgrowth of this attitude. To many executives, audits are
just a necessary evil – why spend money for reports on
last year’s operations which, after all, are ‘water over the
dam?’ Were it not for bankers and stockholders, a good
many audits would never be authorized.
Passage of the Securities Acts gave CPAs a “legally defined
Published by eGrove, 2010
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social obligation: to assist in creating and sustaining investor
confidence in the public capital markets” [Previts and Merino,
1998, p. 274]. They deem this social obligation necessary to justify the claim to professional status. Attainment of the “learned
profession” status of medicine and law was a stated objective in
the initial issue of the JA [Anon., 1905]. Law, medicine, and accounting are professions “in which the articles offered for sale
are advice, counsel, and personal abilities” [Richardson, 1936,
p. 316], with all of these based on both the technical and the
intrinsic, moral components of the practitioner. As law and
medicine had codes of professional ethics, accounting likewise
had an ethical code as a legitimating device.
PROESSIONAL ETHICS AT THE DAWN OF THE DECADE
By June 1931, the AIA had formulated ethics rules that
covered 12 basic areas but did not include independence. These
rules comprise the self-regulatory base line at the beginning of
the decade and are the context for the narrative surrounding
professional ethics that appeared in the JA. At this time, the
ethics is a “state of mind” concept was still held and “was also
used to limit and then justify the small number of written rules”
[Preston et al., 1995, p. 518]. The areas covered by the rules are
as follows (the full text appears as Appendix A) [Richardson,
1931, pp. 155-159]:
1. use of the title “Member American Institute of Accountants”
2. certification of statements which contained essential misstatements
3. prohibition of a non-AIA member from practicing
in the name of a member
4. commissions
5. incompatible occupations
6. certification of statements not verified under supervision of an AIA member
7. efforts to secure legislation without notification of
the Institute
8. solicitation or encroachment on the practice of another member
9. offers of employment to employees of fellow members
10. contingent fees
11. advertisements
12. participation in activities of educational institutions
whose promotional activities were discreditable to
the profession.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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The rules are listed in the order of adoption and reflect
the profession’s strong need for self-regulation instead of a
systematic analysis of ethical issues. The code’s principles were
commandment-like in nature as they were phrased as “thou
shalt not” prohibitions. They did not attempt to imbue a higher
purpose in accountants since character or the accountant’s state
of mind was considered sufficient to provide moral guidance.
The ideals of a gentleman were an underlying linchpin for
rationalizing the narrative of character [Haber, 1991]. The professions whose status accountants aspired to attain shared these
ideals: “Every lawyer, every physician, every accountant, and
every man in every other professional field should be imbued
with a spirit of righteousness and the ideals of a gentleman,”
Richardson [1936, pp. 313-314] stated in an “Ethics in Retrospect” editorial published in the JA’s twenty-fifth anniversary
issue. However, he noted that individuals who did not possess
these gentlemanly ideals were entering the profession, but that
ethics could be learned:
It has been said repeatedly (and the remark, we believe,
was originally made by an eminent member of the accounting profession) that ethics is a state of mind and
he who has it not will never acquire it. This is not literally true, because it is well known that some of the accountants who have entered the profession without a
conception of its real character have been so impressed
by the importance of observing the code of ethics that
they have gradually acquired a conception of the profession totally different from that which they possessed
at the time of their entering in.
Character as an essential professional quality was still advanced,
but the ability to learn aspects of the profession, previously
deemed impossible to learn, was acknowledged.
The public interest of the profession is intertwined with
the private or self-interest aspect of professional ethics [Parker,
1994]. Public-interest objectives are to protect society by safeguarding the economic interests of clients and third parties, delineate client-profession relations, and orient the profession towards social responsibility. Parker [1994, p. 509] defines private
interest as “the latent motivation of ethical codes to protect the
interests of the professional accounting body corporate and its
individual members.” Elements of the private interest are selfcontrol, development of self-professional authority, definition
and maintenance of exclusiveness, and preservation of socioeconomic status and political power.
Published by eGrove, 2010
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Only one strong, primarily public-interest rule existed in the
1931 Code – certification of statements which contained essential misstatements (#2). As bad audit work would impair an accountant’s reputation, there was also a private-interest element.
Just compensation of the accountant was the private-interest
aspect served by rules on commissions (#4) and contingent fees
(#10). These rules also had a public-interest aspect as the separation of payment from work outcome potentially reduced bias.
The contingent-fee rule was passed in 1919 in response to the
Treasury Department’s threat to regulate the many contingencyfee-basis, self-styled “tax experts” who opened shop after the
federal income tax was enacted [Previts and Merino, 1998].
The private interest of self-regulation of the profession was
evidenced in the rules on solicitation or encroachment on the
practice of another member (#8) and offers of employment to
employees of fellow members (#9). Both rules constrained competition for clients and employees within the profession. Rule
#7, efforts to secure legislation without notification of the Institute, serves the private interest of maintaining political power. It
also established the AIA as the sole custodian of narrative with
regulators and legislators. Exclusivity of audit services was the
private interest established by the rules on use of the title “Member American Institute of Accountants”(#1), prohibition of a
non-AIA member to practice as a member (#3), and certification
of statements not verified under supervision of an AIA member
(#6).
Maintenance of social status was the private interest served
by the rules dealing with incompatible occupations (#5), advertisements (#11), and participation in the activities of educational
institutions whose promotional activities were discreditable to
the profession (#12). Professional advertising was condemned
since law and medicine, the professions to whose social status
accountants aspired, did not allow advertising. Richardson
[1936, p. 315] averred that “no man who is a gentleman can
claim for himself any superiority over his fellow.”
The lack of an independence rule may be explained because
independence was considered “intrinsic to the character of the
professional and not easily subject to formal definition” [Preston
et al., 1995, p. 526]. Alternatively, Parker’s [1994] private-interest
model of professional accounting ethics holds that creation of
a professional mystique that renders the profession immune
to evaluation by outsiders to be a crucial, private-interest goal.
If only the accountant could ascertain independence, then the
profession had sole claim to evaluation of a central facet of its
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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operation. Absence of an independence rule served the private
interest of insulation from external monitoring.
INDEPENDENCE
Auditor independence was not in the code of professional
ethics, but it was the subject of considerable discourse in the
JA and of regulatory attention throughout the 1930s. The stockmarket crash “may be viewed as a catalyst, mandating some
form of action to restore confidence in the securities markets”
[Merino et al., 1987]. Frederick Hurdman [1931, p. 303], then
president of the AIA, attempted to improve the perception of the
profession by introducing in 1931 the following resolution mandating auditor independence from the client:
Whereas the relations between a client in the form
of a corporation and the auditor for that corporation
should be one of entire independence, and
Whereas it does not appear to be practicable for the
auditor consistently to hold a dual relationship as auditor and executive of the corporation, and
Whereas the public interest and confidence will
best be preserved by complete separation of these two
functions, therefore be it
Resolved that the maintenance of a dual relationship of director or officer of the corporation while acting as auditor of that corporation is against the best
interest of the public and the profession and tends to
destroy that independence of action considered essential in the relationship between client and auditor.
This resolution, which focused on activities and relationships
to remove external indicators of lack of independence, was defeated in 1932. However, it did not address the full range of incompatible relationships since ownership of an audit client was
not included. The profession’s failure to pass the proposal was a
strong indication of the depth of adherence to independence as
character. Although not enacted, the resolution indicated an acknowledgment of stakeholders in financial reporting since public
interest and confidence were cited as reasons for the adoption of
an independence rule.
It is difficult to reconcile acceptability of stock ownership in
a client and incompatible relationships with the independence
aspect of the 1930s ethics code’s ban on commissions. The prohibition included giving commissions to secure engagements
and receiving commissions from stationery purveyors and other
providers of services to clients. Commissions were prohibited
Published by eGrove, 2010
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as “a professional man who would give his best services must
be absolutely uninfluenced by external matters” [Franke, 1930,
p. 360]. Ironically, the profession acknowledged the possibility
of influence or loss of independence from recommending a
seller of business products but simultaneously felt an ownership interest in a client would not create a similar conflict. The
narrative of character was used to explain the inconsistent positions. Hurdman [1931, p. 304] noted that bankers found a dual
relationship of auditor and director, or auditor and officer, to be
troubling unless “the reputation of the accountant involved was
of such a high character that they felt reasonably certain the
dual relationship did not work harmfully.”
Use of insider information in reorganizations, underwritings, new issues, and stock dividends was also deemed to reduce
independence as it placed the accountant in the position of
receiving a favor from management. Hurdman [1931, p.304]
concluded that no fixed rule regarding stock ownership could
be instituted but did note that the accountant “should keep in
mind the necessity at all times of preserving an independent
relationship and so arranging his investments that he does not
take advantage of the public or permit any hoped-for gain in
market values to influence in any degree his impartial review
and presentation of the facts.” The amount of ownership interest
should be immaterial to the accountant and was to be left to the
accountant’s individual discretion. Hurdman [1931] advanced
the notion that it was unlikely on a practical basis that an accountant would risk potential future earnings and goodwill by
making an inappropriate decision swayed by stock ownership in
a client. This view is consistent with the ethics is a state-of-mind
argument of the narrative of character in which independence
was an intrinsic characteristic of the accountant.
Then, as now, the SEC did not endorse independence as
character but instead favored an objectively determinable approach. SEC rule 650(b) was instituted in 1934 and read as follows [Carey, 1937b, p. 244]:
The commission will not recognize any certified accountant or public accountant as independent who
is not in fact independent. An accountant will not be
considered independent with respect to any person in
whom he has any substantial interest, direct or indirect,
or with whom he is connected as an officer, employee,
promoter, underwriter, trustee, partner, director, or person performing similar functions.
The AIA passed an independence standard in 1934 when
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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pressure from government and the financial press made its passage almost involuntary [Previts and Merino, 1979]. The AIA’s
adopted version of the independence standard read [Carey,
1937b, p. 243]:
Resolved, That no member or associate shall certify the
financial statements of any enterprise financed in whole
or in part by the public distribution of securities if he is
himself the actual or beneficial owner of a substantial
financial interest in the enterprise or if he is committed
to acquire such an interest.
The SEC rule was more comprehensive than that adopted
by the AIA in the same year as it covered both financial and
employment relationship aspects. Both substantial ownership
of a client and incompatible relationships (e.g., director) were
banned. The profession still endorsed independence primarily
as character or a personal attribute since the dual relationship
of auditor and director was not banned in the AIA standard.
Neither did the profession address incompatible services offered
by accountants.
The character/intrinsic-moral-attribute approach to independence and ethics was still held by accountants after the
Securities Acts. After the passage of the Securities Act of 1933,
Frederick Andrews [1934, p. 59] wrote:
Rarely in this country does the public accountant have
such a relation to the stockholders as to give him other
than a moral duty to them, and it is to his everlasting
credit that he recognizes this moral duty so clearly that
he is not infrequently required to suffer direct financial
loss in the performance of it.
The reference to the accountant’s “moral duty” harkens back to
the character narrative. A self-recognized moral duty but not a
legal or professional one was acknowledged, thus illustrating the
degree to which accountants urged the public to rely on their
moral commitment to serve the public interest.
While specialized education enhances further technical
development and thus is a necessary component of legitimacy
of technique, the narrative of character was not abandoned in
the classroom. Warren Nissley [1937, p. 114] lectured at the
new School of Public Accountancy at Columbia University. He
told his accounting students on December 8, 1936 that the most
important of seven essential traits for a successful accounting career was a character with the highest ethical standards.
Although a highly ethical accountant is necessary for the proPublished by eGrove, 2010
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tection of the public interest, ethical behavior was also seen to
have a private-interest aspect. It was noted that for “a public
accountant to perform his work dishonestly would be to commit
vocational suicide.”
The SEC did not accept this argument and held a rather
skeptical attitude expressed by James Landis, then SEC chairman, in a speech: “The impact of almost daily tilts with accountants, some of them called leaders in their profession, often
leaves little doubt that their loyalties to management are stronger than their sense of responsibility to the investor” [quoted
in Nissley, 1937, p. 101]. This reaction had some validity as the
profession articulated its disagreements with the SEC in the JA
on the topics of dual auditor-director relationships and ownership interests in clients.
The profession considered that there were three acceptable exceptions to the ban on dual auditor and director status.
These three exceptions were in the cases of (1) closely held
corporations, (2) auditors employed by a bank to make a credit
examination, and (3) non-profit organizations [Carey, 1937a].
The profession’s conclusion on the dual relationship issue was
that “it can not flatly be said to be wrong in all cases, is clearly
a thing to be avoided whenever possible” [Carey, 1937a, p. 245].
The individual accountant’s character was the factor that would
make the dual relationships acceptable in some cases, thus involving once again the narrative of character.
Both the SEC and the AIA versions of independence banned
a “substantial” financial/ownership stake in a client, but exactly
what constituted “substantial” was a subject of debate. In the
SEC’s second accounting release issued on May 6, 1937, the
Commission stated its position on independence. In addition
to reiterating its opposition to auditor dual relationships, the
release indicated that stock ownership in excess of 1% of an
accountant’s net worth would impair independence [Broad,
1938]. The profession did not consider this a fair rule since
accountants were “recruited from those in moderate circumstances whose incomes are relatively large in relation to their
fortunes” [Carey, 1937b, p. 410]. The word “independence” did
not appear in the code of ethics until issuance of Opinion No.
12: Independence by the AICPA’s Division of Professional Ethics
in 1961 [AICPA, 1970]. Adherence to the personal attribute approach spanned the Atlantic. Upon learning of the ownership
prohibition, English accountants expressed surprise that the
Americans would “permit the inference that their integrity might
be impaired by the dual relationship” [Carey, 1975, p. 80].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6

14

Changing legitimacy narratives about professional ethics and independence in the 1930's Journal of Acco
Roberts, 1930s Ethics and Independence

109

ENGAGEMENT OF AUDITORS
While the SEC attempted to achieve auditor independence
by regulating the profession, the profession’s own independence
efforts were aimed at regulation of the client through altering
how auditors were appointed. Debate centered on two methods
of appointment of auditors, termed the director and the shareholder (or English) methods [Richardson, 1932]. The director
method was predominately used in the U.S. The directors, an
elected board of management, appointed and compensated the
auditors without shareholder oversight. The shareholder method
was a legal requirement in England where the auditors were
elected at the annual meeting by the shareholders themselves.
The shareholders were considered the true owners of the company and were empowered to select their independent investigator “who might almost be called also an arbiter” [Richardson,
1932, p. 321].
Unlike SEC rule 650(b)’s ban on substantial ownership
and incompatible relationships, the shareholder method did
not create constraints on the accountant but instead improved
the auditor’s position vis-à-vis management and the board of
directors. The focus of discussion shifted from regulation of the
accountant to regulation of the client company without further
limitations on accountants themselves. While the discourse
concerning independence utilized the narrative of character,
discussion regarding engagement of auditors used the narrative of technique. In an editorial in the JA, the AIA endorsed the
shareholder plan in 1932. It was noted that when the auditor “is
engaged by the people who are under investigation his personal
independence may be jeopardized and the affairs of the corporation itself may not always be given the complete, objective analysis which they should have” [Richardson, 1932, p. 326].
Some regulatory sentiment concurred with the AIA position
as expressed by Milo Maltbie, chairman of the New York Public
Service Commission [Barton, 1933, p. 98]:
Auditors who are selected by officer are much less inclined to be independent than those selected by stockholders, which is the English plan. In other words, the
value of an ‘independent audit’ depends more upon the
standing of the auditors and the thoroughness of their
investigation than upon the fact that the auditors are
not upon the regular staff of the utility which they are
investigating.
However, by the end of 1933, only Massachusetts and PennsylPublished by eGrove, 2010
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vania had enacted corporation laws that required the auditor
to be selected by the stockholders. The United States Steel
Corporation had voluntarily had its auditors selected by the
stockholders, an action that was seen to anticipate “future emergencies by establishing the auditors as independent advisors of
the stockholder, co-equal for that purpose with the management
itself” [Andrews, 1934, p. 60].
The shareholder method had additional independence
advantages. The auditors had the right to attend and address
the shareholders meeting and state their case before being dismissed [Hunt, 1935]. Under the director method, there was no
forum in which an auditor who resigned an engagement due to
disagreements with management could explain the reason for
the resignation [Nissley, 1937]. In England, the auditor was also
obligated by law to include in his/her certificate whether or not
the directors had satisfied the auditor’s needs for information
[Hunt, 1935], thereby reducing the possibility of audit-scope
limitations. The auditor also had a statutory right to access the
books at any time and to require the officers and directors to
respond to auditor inquiries [Carey, 1938].
Some of the impetus for discussion of the English method
came from the profession’s desire to avoid governmental or
bureaucratic control of auditing and auditors. A governmental
commission to appoint auditors was viewed as unlikely to be
free from political interference with a corresponding negative
impact on an auditor’s independence [Hunt, 1935]. The shareholder method was also viewed as a means to improve audit
quality as “the English practice of fixing the auditor’s fee at annual meetings, might tend to remove restrictions on the scope
of an auditor’s examination, from which he occasionally suffers
because of the management’s desire to reduce expenses” [Carey,
1938, pp. 356-357].
The appointment of auditors was revisited in expert-witness
testimony before the SEC regarding the M&R case and necessary accounting and auditing reforms [Anon., 1939c]. George
Bailey testified that toward the later part of the 1930s, the directors initially selected auditors but managing officers reappointed
auditors subsequently [Anon., 1939c]. Witnesses generally
agreed that engagement by the board of directors or an audit
committee was preferable to engagement by management. This
view was shared by a committee established by the NYSSCPA to
examine audit procedures in the wake of the M&R audit failure
[Stempf, 1939].
Samuel Broad chaired the AIA’s committee that published
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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Examination of Financial Statements by Independent Public
Accountants in 1936 which represented authoritative audit
guidance at the time of the M&R audit. He noted that the shareholder method “is not a panacea because presumably under our
American practice the stockholders, who support the management, either by giving them their proxies, or by voting for their
continuance, would probably confirm the auditor of the management’s choice” [quoted in Anon., 1939c p. 355-356].
THE M&R AUDIT FAILURE AND
THE NARRATIVE OF TECHNIQUE
December 31, 1937 was the date of the last financial statements issued prior to the revelation of the audit failure at M&R.
This fraud came to light in late 1938 and engendered considerable public outcry that startled accountants [Carey, 1939a, p.
65]:
Like a torrent of cold water the wave of publicity raised
by the McKesson & Robbins case has shocked the accountancy profession into breathlessness. Accustomed
to relative obscurity in the public prints, accountants
have been startled to find their procedures, their principles, and their professional standards the subject of
sensational and generally unsympathetic headlines.
While accountants were disconcerted by the public’s reaction,
the fraud was far from a dry, technical problem. Initial reports
of missing funds in the crude drug division run personally by
company president, F. Donald Coster, were followed by the
revelation that Coster was the false identity of a career fraudster, Philip Musica. Faced with an increase in his bail, Coster
committed suicide [New York Times, 1938b]. Strong physical
resemblances led to the discovery that his three brothers used
aliases to collude in the fraud and that two of the brothers had
significant posts at M&R [New York Times, 1938d]. Allegations
of Coster’s arms dealing, bootlegging, and blackmail by several
people who knew his real identity followed.
Amid the human-interest aspects was a financial fraud case
that involved $19 million in fictitious assets, approximately
one-fourth of the total assets shown on the financial statements
[Vanasco et al., 2001]. While observation of inventory was not
yet required, Price, Waterhouse & Co., M&R’s auditors, checked
the “inventory of every other department with extreme diligence,
[but] they accepted the inventory of the crude drug department
on the statement of the company officers in charge” [New York
Published by eGrove, 2010
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Times, 1938c]. The crude drug unit inventories and the Canadian warehouses in which they were supposedly stored were
non-existent [New York Times, 1938a].
Receivables were not confirmed as “either Coster said they
were not necessary or because his success made them seem unnecessary” [New York Times, 1939a]. Coster’s files contained a
copy of “private and confidential” audit instructions issued by
Price, Waterhouse & Co. that “laid bare the scope and operations as well as the schedules that must be drawn up to satisfy
the auditors” [New York Times, 1939b]. In testimony before the
SEC, Ralph Thorn, the in-charge for the M&R audit, stated
the audit instructions were given to the M&R controller as re
quested before each annual audit to show Price Waterhouse was
not doing work for the sake of increasing the audit fee.
M&R was the first landmark case in establishing U.S. audit
evidence standards [Vanasco et al., 2001] and set the precedent
for the SEC’s relationship with the AIA over audit standardsetting policy. This fraud raised concerns about “the adequacy
of audit procedures and financial reports at a time when postdepression investor confidence was just beginning to be restored
in the stock market” [Previts and Flesher, 1994, p. 222]. While
the fraud reduced the value of M&R’s stock, it did not have a
depressive impact on stock-market prices as a whole [Wright,
2002].
The accounting profession’s response to negative reaction
by the public and regulators was to engage in a narrative that
emphasized the scientific, rational, and technical aspects of
accountancy rather than the character narrative used by the
profession at the start of the decade. The M&R scandal was
such that a character narrative was rendered unsupportable and
unlikely to be effective. The AIA’s press release stated the “case
was an extraordinary one in which there was testimony indicating collusive fraud on the part of high officers and the forging of
accounting records.” The press release framed the issue as “the
problem of auditing was to find means of affording adequate
protection at a cost which would not constitute an undue burden on honestly administered companies” [Carey, 1939b, p. 66].
Upon election as commissioner of the SEC, Jerome Frank
issued a statement to the press that, “We want to be sure that
the public never has reason to lose faith in the reports of public accountants. To this end the independence of the public
accountant must be preserved and strengthened and standards
of thoroughness and accuracy protected” [Carey, 1939d, p.
2]. Although the commissioner referred to independence as
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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a key issue, independence was not a key feature in the expert
testimony from hearings before the SEC that the JA published
in three succeeding issues starting in April 1939. Instead the
profession’s experts focused on (1) implementation of a natural
business year, (2) early notification of the auditor’s appointment,
(3) increased explication of accounting standards, (4) a change
in the form of the audit report, and (5) education of the public
about what the audit signifies [Anon., 1939a, b, c]. All of these
points focus on techniques rather than moral or ethical aspects
of accounting practice. The client company and the public are
the focus of the suggested reforms.
The natural business year is “a fiscal year which will close
at that month-end which has been shown by experience over the
years to be the one at which there is the lowest ebb of activity”
[Anon., 1939b, p. 280]. C.O. Wellington testified before the SEC
that adoption of the natural business year “would contribute as
much, and perhaps more, than any other one change toward
improving auditing practice” [Anon., 1939c, p. 357]. Accounts
receivable and inventory fraud figured prominently in the M&R
case, and it was considered that their balances would be lowest
at the natural business year-end. Low balances would reduce
the audit work on these accounts and reduce their percentage
impact on the balance sheet.
The audit had to be completed after the closing of the books
and before the stockholders’ meeting, dates that were set by the
company’s charter at the suggestion of the company’s attorneys
[Anon., 1939b]. Scheduling the audit at the lowest point in the
business cycle, the natural business year-end, would facilitate
completion of the audit in a timely manner. The natural business
year was deemed to allow accountants to manage better their
practices by a more even allocation of work throughout the year.
Staffing would be improved as auditors would be able to maintain a more constant staff, attract staff of greater ability, and require fewer temporary staff. The cost of audits would be reduced
as well [Anon., 1939c]. Enhanced credit analysis of financial
statements by banks was also claimed as all companies within a
particular industry would be received at a non-peak time [Anon.,
1939c]. The cure-all-ills claims for the natural business year
are reminiscent of the profession’s claims for the shareholder
method of auditor appointment; however, neither item was likely
to be the panacea the profession claimed. Both the shareholder
method and the natural business year are evidence of narratives
focused on technique that directed the postulated change away
from the accountant’s personal and professional conduct as the
Published by eGrove, 2010
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means to cope with negative publicity and calls for reforms in
the accounting profession.
The need for development and codification of accounting
principles was reflected in the state of financial reporting as
described by John Haskell [1938, pp. 296, 298], a member of
the NYSE, who noted that “the annual reports of some are so
brief that they could be printed on a postage stamp.” Further,
some companies “have been unable to describe their practice as
to depreciation as a policy, for the simple reason that they had
none.” Frank Shallenberger’s [1939, p. 267] speech in October
1939 noted “the chief obligation of the profession to the public
at the present time is the clarification of accounting principles.”
While clear accounting principles were important, intangible
personal characteristics of the accountant were deemed important as well. “No statement of principles can replace the good
judgment and integrity of the professional accountant any more
than floodlights and the radio beacon can be substituted for the
experience and skill of the pilot. They can both serve as great
aids to him” [Haskell, 1938, p. 300].
In statements that presage the expectation gap of the 1970s,
the profession lamented that the public neither understood the
meaning of the audit report nor what accountants do. The lack
of understanding revealed “the growing tendency of the public
to expect more from the certified public accountant than he can
deliver” [Stempf, 1939, p. 23]. The public, it was felt, did not
understand that the financial statements are the representation
of the client rather than the accountant, and “that accountants
merely express an opinion – expert to be sure – rather than ascertain inexorable facts” [Seidman, 1939, p. 120]. The problem
was mainly framed as an educational or publicity issue that
would benefit the profession if accountants would not be asked
to perform functions to which they were not prepared to attest. Usefulness in the capital markets of public understanding
of the audit certificate was also recognized: “The falling tree in
the forest produces no sound if there is no ear to hear it; the
painter creates no art if there is no audience to appreciate it; the
accountant fails in his function if he does not convey true and
sound reports which can be understood and used for the purposes for which they are intended” [Wilcox, 1939, p. 152].
The narrative of technique was invoked strongly to regain
the profession’s legitimacy after this large and publicity generating audit failure. While rhetoric regarding accounting principles,
audit procedures, and changes to natural fiscal year-ends were
featured in the SEC hearings testimony, the JA cautioned that
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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character was necessary as well: “It must be understood that an
audit report is the professional opinion of the accountant who
submits it and that its value is in direct proportion to his personal competence and integrity” [Carey, 1939d, p. 194]. Technique
trumps character as competence, a component of technical
qualifications and accuracy, is listed before integrity, a personal
moral component of the individual accountant’s character.
CONCLUSION
Print media was a primary means of communication in the
1930s, and the JA articulated issues that concerned the profession as defined primarily by leaders of its professional organization. The monthly JA was a serious news source about the
profession. Printing the text of speeches given at professional
meetings increased communication with the AIA’s national
membership. Both editors used their editorial platform to engage in dialog with external institutions. Carey’s editorials in
particular responded to regulators’ public statements. The AIA
was the surviving organization in the consolidation of professional associations that concluded in 1936, and the JA attempted
to create a national, unified voice to cope with economic uncertainties and regulatory pressures.
Alteration of narrative types did not drive the editor change
at the beginning of 1937, but the type of narrative changed at
about the same time. Richardson’s editorship started in 1912
and covered most of the early period in Preston et al.’s [1995]
study that found the narrative of character to be the profession’s
legitimacy strategy. Richardson advocated the ethics is a stateof-mind tenet in his JA editorials. His JA twenty-fifth anniversary
editorial noted “the very substance of professional life depends
upon adherence at all times to the moral code” [Richardson,
1936, p. 313]. However, this editorial also included comments
indicating a transition to the narrative of legitimacy. Carey assumed the editorship after the economic crisis of 1929 and the
regulatory watershed of the Securities Acts. While Carey’s writings acknowledge elements of character, these two events made
the narrative of character less viable as his editorials increasingly turned to the narrative of technique.
Transition to the narrative of technique was accelerated
when the M&R audit failure occurred with its attendant negative publicity in the mainstream press. The profession reacted
with discourse that focused attention away from the accountant
as a person toward external professional elements, such as the
Published by eGrove, 2010
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scientific and technical expertise of its members. There was no
mention of any aspect of character in the portion of the nearly
1,500 pages of expert testimony before the SEC that the JA
selected for publication. Expertise used on behalf of the public
formed the narrative that validated the legitimacy of the profession. The profession also proposed regulatory changes to deflect
regulation of the profession toward regulation of client com
panies. Reframing regulatory discussion diminished criticism of
the profession while attempting to establish a better position for
the profession with client companies.
Advocacy of the shareholder or English method of auditor appointment was the profession’s first attempt to regulate
the client during the 1930s. This effort predated the SEC’s independence regulation and continued throughout the decade.
Shareholders’ appointment of auditors was touted as increasing
auditor independence from management. This attempt to deflect
regulation of the profession had both an ethical and a technical
or practical component. Alternatively stated, it had both a public
and a private-interest aspect. The natural business year was the
client-directed proposal that arose towards the end of the decade
and was emphasized during the M&R audit failure testimony.
There was no character or independence aspect in the discourse
surrounding the natural business year. The proposal was framed
purely as a technique that would improve audit quality. The
transition from character to technique that is reflected in the
discourse in the JA is also evinced in the nature of the other reforms the profession proposed.
Claims to legitimacy were on the cusp of change from the
overtly moral, or principles-based, narrative of character to an
objective scientific, or rules-based, narrative of technique. While
character and technique are at opposite ends of the spectrum,
the profession needed both character and technique to serve
the public interest. To fulfill its social responsibilities, “knowledge and courage are the stuff of which accountants must be
made” [Shallenberger, 1939, p. 266]. While both character and
technique elements are acknowledged, the technique element,
knowledge, came first and the character element, courage, was
the afterthought. Carey [1939c, p. 195] wrote in an 1939 edi
torial that “the personal character and integrity of the auditor is
the prime factor upon which the profession rests. There must, of
course, be common standards of procedure, there must be definition of his legal responsibilities of the scope of his work, but
the public should be constantly reminded that these are guides
to better performance, not screens to conceal superficial work.”
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol37/iss2/6
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Character and integrity were still primal, thus identifying
a central problem that could not be regulated away. Abbott’s
[1998] contention that regulation is the most significant factor
in the movement to use of the narrative of technique was evidenced in the accounting profession’s experience in the 1930s.
Both the 1929 market crash and the M&R fraud focused such
significant regulatory attention on the profession as to render
adherence to the narrative of character untenable and to require
adoption of the narrative of technique.
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APPENDIX A
Rules of Professional Conduct
Adopted by the Council of the American Institute of Accountants with
amendments in effect June 1931 [Richardson, 1931, pp. 155-159]
(1) A firm or partnership, all of the individual members of which are
members of the Institute (or in part members and in part associates, provided all the members of the firm are either members or
associates), may describe itself as “Members of the American Institute of Accountants,” but a firm or partnership, all the individual
members of which are not members of the Institute (or in part
members and in part associates), or an individual practicing under
a style demoting a partnership when in fact there be no partner or
partners or a corporation or an individual or individuals practicing
under a style demoting a corporate organization shall not use the
designation “Members (or Associates) of the American Institute of
Accountants.”
(2) The preparation and certification of exhibits, statements, schedules or other forms of accountancy work, containing an essential
misstatement of fact or omission therefrom of such a fact as would
amount to an essential misstatement of a failure to put prospective
investors on notice in respect of an essential or material fact not
specifically shown in the balance-sheet itself shall be, ipso facto,
cause for expulsion or for such other discipline as the council may
impose upon proper presentation of proof that such misstatement
was either willful or the result of such gross negligence as to be
inexcusable.
(3) No member or associate shall allow any person to practice in his
name as a public accountant who is not a member or an associate
of the Institute or in partnership with him or in his employ on a
salary.
(4) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly allow or agree
to allow a commission, brokerage or other participation by the
laity in the fees or profits of his professional work; nor shall he accept directly or indirectly from the laity any commission, brokerage or other participation for professional or commercial business
turned over to others as an incident of his services to clients.
(5) No member or associate shall engage in any business or occupation conjointly with that of a public accountant, which in the opinion of the executive committee or of the council is incompatible or
inconsistent therewith.
(6) No member or associate shall certify to any accounts, exhibits,
statements, schedules or other forms of accountancy work which
have not been verified entirely under the supervision of himself, a
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member of his firm, one of this staff, a member or an associate of
this Institute or a member of a similar association of good standing in a foreign country which has been approved by the council.
(7) No member or associate shall take part in any effort to secure the
enactment or amendment of any state or federal law or of any
regulation of any governmental or civic body, affecting the practice of the profession, without giving immediate notice thereof to
the secretary of the Institute, who in turn shall at once advise the
executive committee or the council.
(8) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly solicit the
clients or encroach upon the business of another member or associate, but it is the right of any member or associate to give proper
service and advice to those asking such service or advice.
(9) No member or associate shall directly or indirectly offer employment to an employee of a fellow member or associate without first
informing said fellow member or associate of his intent. This rule
shall not be construed so as to inhibit negotiations with anyone
who of his own initiative or in response to public advertisement
shall apply to a member or an associate for employment.
(10) No member or associate shall render or offer to render professional service, the fee for which shall be contingent upon his findings
and the results thereof.
(11) No member or associate of the Institute shall advertise his other
professional attainments or service through the mails, in the public prints, by circular letters or by any other written word, except
that a member or an associate may cause to be published in the
public prints what is technically known as a card. A card is hereby
defined as an advertisement of the name, title (member of the
American Institute of Accountants, C.P.A., or other professional
affiliation or designation), class of service and address of the advertiser, without any further qualifying words or letters, or in the
case of announcement of change of address or personnel of firm
the plain statement of the fact for the publication of which the
announcement purports to be made. Cards permitted by this rule
when appearing in newspapers shall not exceed two columns in
width and three inches in depth; when appearing in magazines,
directories and similar publications cards shall not exceed one
quarter page in size. This rule shall not be construed to inhibit the
proper and professional dissemination of impersonal information
among member’s own clients or personal associates or the properly restricted circulation of firm bulletins containing staff personnel
and professional information.
(12) No member or associate of the Institute shall be an officer, a director, stockholder, representative, an agent, a teacher or lecturer,
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nor participate in any other way in the activities or profits of any
university, college or school which conducts its operations, solicits
prospective students or advertises its course by methods which in
the opinion of the committee on professional ethics are discreditable to the profession.
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